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Chapter 3
Pension Financial Security in Germany
Peter Ahrend
Importance of Occupational Pensions
The provision of retirement income in Germany is principally based on
three sources: social security, company-sponsored pensions, and private
retirement accounts. However, 80 percent of the working population
draw the main part of their retirement, disability, or survivors' income
from social securi ty.
The financing of Germany's social security system is shared equally
between the employer and the employee. The actual contribution rate
for each is 9.6 percent of income up to the social security contribution
ceilingofUS$ 4,606 per month, in 1994.1 Social security is based on a pay-
as-you-go system, often referred to as the "contract between the genera-
tions," since the working population finances the current pension pay-
ments (principle of solidarity). Because society is aging and contribution
volumes are becoming insufficient, the social security system will face
severe problems in the future. At present, German social security insur-
ance can rely on a relationship of contributors to retirees of 100 to 44.
However, by the year 2040 this ratio is expected to have worsened to one
toone.
Once reform measures have become completely effective by 2012, the
average social security pension will stabilize at a lower level, relative to
earnings. The "income gap" opening up between this percentage and
the income required to maintain the prior standard of living can only be
closed by private retirement accounts and occupational benefits. The ac-
tual extent of the income gap depends not only on the social security level
but also on the net income of active employees, which is determined by
the percentage of gross income payable as taxes and social security con-
tributions. This was 16 percent in 1960, 23 percent in 1970, 29 percent in
1980, and has risen to around 33 percent at present. The resulting de-
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velopment of the net replacement level of social security over the years is
illustrated in Figure 1. The actual income gap for 1994 is shown in Figure
2. In this context it should be pointed out that for a large part of the
population the possibility of making private provisions is quite limited
since this has to be done from taxed income. In general, individuals can-
not establish individual retirement accounts and receive a tax deduction.
Due to the reduction of the social security level in the long term, as well
as to the restricted possibilities for private provisions, the subject of oc-
cupational pensions has become an important issue of social policy. To
provide an overview of the general economic background to any benefit
issues, the development of wages, the cost of living, social security, and
productivity since 1957 have been depicted in Figure 3.
The Historical Development of German OCcupational
Pensions
The Early Stages
The first German company-sponsored pension plans were established
in the middle of the nineteenth century by chemical companies and
those in heavy industry. These were characterized by their patriarchal
approach and the employee's personal dependence on the employer.
Their purpose was to protect old people who could no longer rely on the
social network of a large family, since the latter as a "workplace and
household entity" disintegrated during the course of industrialization.
Employers, therefore, were predominantly driven by "care" motives for
their former employees. At the time when statutory disability insurance
was introduced for workers (1891) and subsequently extended to sal-
aried employees (1911) company pension plans were already becoming
widespread. Their spread was further helped by the inflation of 1923,
which completely destroyed any private retirement accounts employees
might have made (devalued savings versus provisions out of current com-
pany earnings). Along with the change in the employer-workforce rela-
tionship that took place between the two world wars the provision of
company-sponsored pensions became based more and more on objective
reasons rather than on personal motives. The moral concept of respon-
sibility for staff welfare was replaced by the principle that a pension was a
fringe benefit provided by employers.
After World War II: Setting the Coursefor the Dominance ofInternal Financing
High inflation in 1948, in the aftermath of the second world war, set
the course for today's dominance of internal financing for occupational
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TABLE 1 Spread of Company-Sponsored Pensions in the Industrial Sector
in Germany (Western Laender)
Companies Emplayees
with an Occupational Entitled to Company-
Pension Plan SponslYred Pensions
(% ofwmpanies (% ofemplayees
belonging belonging
to the respective grouP) to the respective group)
Industry 1981 1 19872 1993' 1981 1 19872 1993'
Number ofEmplayees
20-49 50 39 45 27 23 18
50-199 75 75 73 47 46 40
200-999 92 91 91 70 68 62
1000+ 97 99 97 85 91 85
Industry Total 67 61 64 70 72 66
Basic and producer goods 77 72 71 76 83 78
Capital goods 70 62 66 75 78 69
Consumer goods 59 54 57 53 50 46
Food processing 68 64 65 62 59 57
Sources: lifo survey June/July 1981; 'lfo survey November/December 1987; 'lfo survey
June/July 1993.
pensions, to be examined shortly in more detail. According to the (cur-
rency) Transition Act June 1948 (Umstellungsgesetz) all pensions directly
paid by companies had to be continued to be paid completely, whereas all
other kinds of occupational retirement benefits were converted at a ratio
of 10:1 from "Reichsmark" into "Deutschmark." Encouragement of the
internal financing method, which until then was scarcely to be found, was
due to economic and fiscal considerations.
Like all other economic sectors, the banking and financial sector was
devastated, so reconstruction of the economy based on loan capital was
impossible. In addition, the tax law of the allied forces (Allied Control
Commission Act. No. 12 ofFebruary 1946) imposed marginal tax rates of
up to 90 percent on company profits. Disclosing a liability for future pen-
sion obligations in the balance sheet meant that income taxes could be
deferred and the means to finance reconstruction were made available.
For employees the extension of occupational pension systems meant
an improvement in their retirement provisions. In 1948 the level ofsocial
security was around 25 percent of net earnings and was intended to
provide the necessary means of existence. With the Social Security Re-
form Act of 1957 this objective was altered in favor of the maintenance of
the prior standard ofliving. Today an employee with a salary ofUS$ 2,425
per month can expect to receive a pension of 47.5 percent after 45 insur-
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TABLE 2 Spread of Company-Sponsored Pensions in the Trade Sector
in Germany (Western Laender)
Companies with an EmpUryees Entilkd to
Occupational Pension Plan Company-Sponsored Pension
(% ofcompanies bewnging to (% ofempUryees bewnging to
the respective grouP) the respective grouP)
Trade 1981' 19872 1993' 1981 1 19872 1993'
Number of
EmpUryees
3-5 21 23 28 12 9 12
6-9 28 38 36 12 19 11
10-19 40 32 42 12 11 12
20-49 50 47 55 15 15 16
50-199 67 71 61 27 28 23
200-499 81 85 70 30 44 27
500+ 85 87 85 62 54 61
Trade Total 30 32 34 28 28 28
Wholesale trade 37 31 38 30 29 27
Retail trade 27 33 33 28 27 28
Sources: 'Ifo survey June/July 1981; '!fo survey November/December 1987; 'Ifo survey
June/July 1993.
ance years. However, it should not be forgotten that in former days all
company pension entitlements were lost once the employee decided to
move to another employer.
The extent to which company pension plans are now to be found in
companies in industry and trade is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2.
Legal Foundations of Occupational Pensions
Only in very exceptional cases are German occupational pension plans
mandated to provide company benefits, as is the case in countries like
France, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Occupational pensions in
Germany are governed by tax law and labor law, as well as insurance con-
trollaw and trade and company law. However, when company-sponsored
benefits are granted by the employer on a voluntary basis, a pension
obligation exists only if an actual liability has been established. Under the
German legal system even an oral promise is binding, although a written
statement is required if book reserves are to be disclosed in the tax
balance sheet.
On a collective basis, a pension entitlement can be established either
through an agreement with the works councilor through a collective
agreement. However, the benefit levels of such codetermined pension
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plans generally do not differ significantly from plans established without
employee codetermination. Accordingly, the character of company pen-
sion systems is a voluntary and additional one following the principle of
subsidiary.
Generally, the legal foundations of a company pension scheme can be
ofan individual or a collective nature. As regards the possible forms of in-
dividual contracts, special attention is required by the so-called "standard
contractual regulation" and the "overall pension promise." The former
represents a number of identical individual pension promises, whereas
the latter describes a pension promise by established individual contract.
yet given to the entire workforce or to a certain group ofemployees, either
by publishing the pension plan on the notice board or by an oral or writ-
ten announcement. Both are individual contractual pension promises to
each individual employee, but they still contain a collective element, since
all employees or groups ofemployees receive identical pension promises.
Further legal foundations for the creation of pension entitlements on
an individual basis are the principle ofequal treatment as well as the inter-
pretation of "standard practice." According to the principle of equal
treatment, equal facts have to be treated in the same way if there is no sub-
stantial reason for differentiation. With regard to occupational pension
benefits this principle means that employees may not be excluded from
pension promises if comparable employees are given pension promises.
The principle of "standard practice" applies if no formal written or
. unwritten pension promises or plans exist, but nevertheless the employer
regularly provides benefits according to a certain scheme. This practice
establishes a pension entitlement for active employees.
Important Aspects of Labor Law
Once an occupational pension scheme has been introduced by the em-
ployer. it is subject not only to the Law on the Constitution of Business
Undertakings, the code of civil law, and extensive case law but also to the
minimum standards set by the Improvement of Occupational Pensions
Act (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung [BetrAVG]) of
December 1974, with a volume of32 sections not including the tax provi-
sions. This act was drafted for employee protection, improving their sta-
tus in several areas.2
Vesting
This provision was intended to facilitate the mobility of employees,
desirable in times when the economy is prospering, by recognizing that
an employee's pension entitlement depends on the employee's having
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worked for a company until retirement. Irrespective of who initiated the
termination of employment, an employee wilI keep his or her pension
entitlement under section I BetrAVG ifhe or she has attained age 35 and
the pension promise has been in existence for 10 years or if the employee
has been with the company for at least 12 years and the pension promise
has been in existence for at least three years. The amount of the vested
entitlement wilI then be determined on a pro rata temporis basis. First,
the entitlement has to be calculated on the basis of what the employee
would have had if he or she had stayed with the company until normal
retirement age. Then this theoretical entitlement is reduced by the ratio
of actual service years to total possible service years.
Restrictions on Offsetting and Reductions
It is not permitted to reduce benefits in course of payment after the
occurrence of the pensionable incident by taking into account the index-
ation of other benefits. Furthermore, it is also forbidden to take into
account other benefits that have been financed entirely by the employee.
This does not apply to social security benefits as long as they have been
financed equalIy by the employer and the employee or to other benefits
that the employer has financed by at least 50 percent.
Early Retirement
Under the BetrAVG the employee can claim the company pension be-
fore attaining normal retirement age (usualIy age 65) if the employee
draws a fulI retirement pension from social security. However, the law
does not mention the amount of this early retirement benefit, leaving it to
the contracting parties to determine. In practice, an actuarial reduction
rate is often applied for each month before the normal retirement date the
pension is received. In the majority of cases this reduction rate has been
set roughly actuarially neutral at 0.5 percent. Its purpose is to compensate
for the longer payment period resulting from the earlier retirement date.
Insolvency Protection
Under the BetrAVG, provisions are made in the event the company
should not be able to meet the claims arising from its pension scheme. All
pension plans except those through pension funds and direct insurance
with irrevocable rights are subject to the mandatory insolvency insurance
established by the Act. Because of the fundamental importance of insol-
vency insurance for this chapter, this subject wilI be examined in more
detail later.
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Adjustment ofPensions in the Course ofPayment
Regulation was introduced by the BetrAVG to protect pensions against
inflation in the course of payment. It does not apply to deferred pension
entitlements before payment and lump sum payments. Every three years
the employer is obliged to review whether an adjustment is required.
Specific factors to be considered include the needs of the beneficiary and
the economic situation of the employer. As established by a decision of
the Federal Labor Court, the needs of beneficiaries are described as
compensation for the inflation rate according to a specific consumer
price index. Only if the net incomes of the active employees have been
growing slower than the rate of inflation during the past three years may
the employer provide a benefit increase at this lower rate. The adjust-
ment may be entirely or partially avoided if the economic situation of the
company does not allow a full adjustment. This would be the case if the
burden of adjusting all pensions under review would have to be met out
of company assets.
Until recently it was generally accepted that at any review date adjust-
ments only had to be made for the three-year period immediately prior
and that a decision whether to adjust fully, partially, or not at all would
be ,final without any consequences for later review dates. However, on
April 28, 1992 the Federal Labor Court decided that any adjustments
avoided since the beginning of pension payment will have to be made up
for'at a later date, once the economic situation of the company permits.
Any former adjustments exceeding the cost ofliving requirement may be
tak.en into account. Further, the development of the net incomes of the
active employees of the company is used as a standard of comparison.
Germany is the only country within the European Community that has
imposed an obligation to adjust pensions derived from voluntary occupa-
tional retirement benefit plans. In other countries, mandatory indexa-
tion of pensions exists but only as regards obligatory company pension
systems. So, the difference concerns whether the company pension sys-
tem is obligatory or not. Whereas in other European countries the adjust-
ment is indirectly obligatory (because the company pension system as
such is mandatory), in Germany the adjustment is obligatory but the
company pension system is not mandatory.
'lYpes of Financing Arrangements
Occupational pensions in Germany can be financed either directly by
the company through accrued book reserves (internal financing) or
through a legally independent institution (external financing), in which
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case actual contributions have to be paid. Consequently a differentiation
is made between direct and indirect pension promises.
The employer may choose among four different financing methods:
direct pension promise, support fund, direct insurance, and pension
fund. The benefits granted usually include retirement, disability, and
survivors' benefits and are paid as either a pension or a lump sum, al-
though lump sum benefits are of little importance in Germany. A sum-
mary of their characteristics is given in Table 3.
Direct Pension Promise
Direct pension promises are the prevailing financing arrangements
in Germany. The employer has a direct liability to pay the benefits to
the employee or his or her survivors. Hence, the benefits are paid by the
company, directly out of the company assets. In the balance sheet the
book reserves represent a long-term unfunded pension liability that re-
duces the taxable company profit. During the time of accrual the de-
ferred tax liability can be used for investments without borrowing from
the financial markets. The company achieves a positive financing effect
through the accrual of book reserves. Employee contributions, however,
are not permitted.
Support Fund
A support fund is a legally independent institution with separate assets,
set up by one or several companies. Its legal form is usually a "registered
society" (eingetragener Verein, e.v.) or a "limited liability company" (Gesell-
schaft mit beschriinkter Haftung [GmbH]). A special characteristic is that
the employee or the employee's survivors have no legal entitlement to
the benefits, since the fiscal treatment generally does not allow a suffi-
cient accrual of funds during active employment, with the exception of
current premiums for a reinsurance. Full financing through allocations
by the company is possible after the occurrence of a pensionable inci-
dent. If the support fund does not have sufficient assets to cover benefit
claims, the employer is liable for pension payments. Employee contribu-
tions to the support fund are not permitted. A support fund may provide
ad hoc benefits.
Pension Fund
A pension fund is a legally independent institution set up by one or sev-
eral companies. Its legal form is usually a "mutual insurance association"
TABLE 3 Summary of Financing Methods, Germany
Characteristics
legal characteristics/
carrier of benefit
promise
State insurance control
formal legal entitlement
Insolvency protection
through PSVaG for le-
gally vested en ti tle-
ments and current
benefits
prefinancing of benefits
Direct Pension Promise
company itself
no
required for accrual of
book reserves in tax
balance sheet; other-
wise depending on
plan
yes
yes, through accrual of
book reserves
Support Fund
legally independent en-
tity (e.V. GmbH, sel-
dom: trust founda-
tion)
no
no
yes
no, only accrual for re-
serves; funds allo-
cated after pension-
able incident
Pension Fund
legally independent en-
tity (WaG)
yes
yes
no
yes
Direct Insurance
insurance company
yes
yes
no, if irrevocable right;
yes, if revocable righ t
or if pledged, as-
signed or used as col-
lateral
yes
possible possible
allocations to book re- allocations by the com-
serve not taxable as pany not taxable as in-
income come
taxable as income, however tax-exempt amount of
40% (max. DM 6,000 p.a.) under section 19 (2)
EStG
taxable as income with tax-exempt amount; possible
to divide income by three and multiply the income
tax on this amount by three [section 34 (3) EStGj
possible
loan of insurer to spon-
soring company possi-
ble by raising a loan
on the insurance pol-
icy
not taxablenot taxable ifduration
of insurance was more
than 12 years and con-
tributions were ac-
ceptable as additional
expenses for tax pur-
poses
possible
only according to regu-
lations of the Insur-
ance Control Act;
loan to sponsoring
company only possi-
ble with approval of
supervisory authority
no nla
taxation with flat rate through company possible,
otherwise expenses for provisions within allowed
limits
only interest part under section 22 EStG
not possible
liberal, as long as busi-
ness objective of sup-
port fund does not
change; loan to spon-
soring company possi-
ble and customary
not possible
liberal, no obligation to
invest
taxation of pension pay-
ments
employee contributions
investment of assets
taxation oflump sum
benefits
reinsurance
contributions taxable as
income
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(Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit). Therefore, it is subject to state
insurance control by the Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance Com-
panies (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Versicherungswesen, VaG). Employees
or their survivors must have a legal entitlement to the benefits. The pen-
sion fund is financed by employer contributions, with employee contri-
butions being possible and customary. This is the prevalent financing
method among large companies and certain industry sectors (group
pension funds).
Direct Insurance
In direct insurance, a life insurance is effected by the employer, who
is the policy holder on the life of the employee. The employee or his
survivors have to be fully or partially entitled to the insurance benefit. It is
the insurance company who pays the benefits, and the insurance is fi-
nanced by employer contributions, with employee contributions being
possible.
Of the total funds of US$ 244 billion accumulated for all pension
purposes in 1991, the individual financing methods accounted for the
following percentages:
Book reserves
Pension fund
Direct insurance
Support fund
58 percent
22 percent
11 percent
9 percent
Total expenses for the provision of company-sponsored benefits in Ger-
many, including all financing methods, amounted to US$ 18.45 billion in
1991. In the same year all benefits paid out totaled US$ 10.75 billion
(ABA 1993).
Financing Principles
Financing of Direct Pension Promises
To finance a direct pension promise a book reserve has to be accrued and
disclosed in the tax and trade balance sheet according to the following
provisions.
The company has an obligation to disclose a liability in the trade bal-
ance sheet for pension promises effective after December 31, 1986,
according to section 247 of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch,
HGB).
If pension promises were given before January 1, 1987 the company
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continues to have an option whether to disclose the book reserve fully,
partially, or not at all under paragraph 28 of the Introductory Act to the
Commercial Code (Einfuhrungsgesetz zum Handelsgesetzbuch, EGHGB).
Nevertheless, stock companies are obliged under paragraph 28 EGHGB
to report in the appendix to the balance sheet any book reserves not
disclosed in the balance sheet itself.
Under section 6a of the Income Tax Act (Einkvmmensteuergesetz, EStG) a
tax-effective book reserve can be accrued for pension liabilities. However,
the wording of section 6a EStG provides that the obligation to disclose a
liability in the trade balance sheet is decisive for a disclosure in the tax
balance sheet. The amount of the book reserve disclosed in the tax bal-
ance sheet may not exceed the book reserve determined under commer-
ciallaw. Any possible deficits in the tax balance sheet may not generally
be made up for at a later date. For pension promises effective before
December 31, 1986 the option whether to disclose a liability for tax pur-
poses follows the provisions under commercial law.
The main characteristics of book reserves are that they are borrowed
capital and that they represent a liability ofwhich the purpose but not the
amount (kind and due date) is known. Valuation for tax purposes takes
account of actuarial assumptions, such as mortality tables, invalidity ta-
bles, and a discount rate of 6 percent (in 1994). In 1955 the minimum
discount rate had been set at 3.5 percent. With the Tax Reform Act of
1960 this minimum discount rate was increased to 5.5 percent. A further
increase to 6 percent was brought about by the budget law of 1981 (Haus-
haltsstrukturgesetz, German Federal Law Gazette I, 1981, p. 1523). An in-
crease of the discount rate has the effect that the annual allocations
to book reserves are reduced, thus leading to higher taxable company
profits. With the enactment of the Act on the Improvement of Occupa-
tional Pensions (1974) the minimum discount rate became an obligatory
discount rate. The reason was the need for a uniform approach to calcu-
late settlements for vested pension entitlements as well as the contribu-
tions to insolvency insurance, which are determined on the basis of the
book reserves calculated with the "entry age normal" method.
Under this method, each employee is assumed to have entered the
plan when first employed or as soon as becoming eligible (age 30 at the
earliest to account for fluctuations). The current service cost is a level
annual amount sufficient to provide the required benefit in the actuarial
valuation, when invested at the rate of interest required by the German
tax authority. A higher discount rate would result in lower settlement
payments and in lower contributions to insolvency insurance. As another
consequence of the entry age normal method, defined contribution
plans, which do not focus on a defined benefit but focus instead on a
periodic pension contribution volume for cost control purposes are not
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very widespread, because a pension increase due to a new con tribution is
also effective for the past.
The mere accounting procedure of accruing book reserves as a long
term liability for pension purposes in the balance sheet reduces the tax-
able profit of the company and, thereby, its income tax burden. However,
since the profit of the company increases once pension payments have
started, due to the dissolution of the book reserve on an annual basis, the
initial tax reduction only represents a long-term tax deferment. The
financing effect of book reserve accrual results from the cash flow im-
provements and the interest payments saved on loan capital.~
Financing of Support Funds
The parent company transfers funds for benefit payments to the support
fund under the provisions of section 4d EStG. Current benefits may be
financed in full, whereas for future benefit entitlements only an overall
allocation to a reserve is allowed. Financing as such is quite liberal. The
company has no obligation to allocate funds to the support fund. Should
the support fund not have sufficient funds for benefit payments, they can
be directly paid by the company.
If the company has not transferred sufficient funds to the support
fund, this liability does not have to be disclosed in the balance sheet.
However, it is obligatory to show this liability in the appendix to the
balance sheet (section 28, EGHGB). Allocations are limited in two ways:
by the maximum annual allocation and the maximum permitted assets of
the support fund. Both restrictions depend on the kind of benefits pro-
vided by the support fund -life annuities, annuities, or both.
Like book reserves, allocations to a support fund have a financial effect
for the parent company. The allocations reduce its taxable profit and,
thereby, the income or corporate tax burden. In addition, it is possible in
Germany for the support fund to provide the parent company with a loan
out of its funds. This procedure enables the company to substitute equity
by loan capital without having to approach external financial markets.'
Financing of Pension Funds
A pension fund is a life insurance company in the form of a mutual
insurance company and with a non-profit character. Pension funds are
financed through contributions during the active employment of the
beneficiary and employee contributions are not only possible but stan-
dard practice. Contributions have to be so calculated that the pension
fund can accumulate the necessary funds for cover during the active
employment period. The prescribed discount rate is 3.5 percent. Further,
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the contributions have to be so calculated that they cover the promised
benefits as well as any administration costs, but they may also not exceed
this level. On the other hand, the future pension payment must corre-
spond to the contribution payments (principle of equivalence in insur-
ance). This last point applies equally to the financing ofdirect insurance.
Taxation of German OCcupational Pension Funds
To describe the taxation of the four possible financing methods, one has
to distinguish between the employer and the employee as well as between
the taxation of contributions and final benefits. Generally, taxation is
governed by the "principle of income inflow." Accordingly, all different
parts of total lifetime income may only be taxed once.
Depending on the financing method, either the pension-financing
period is regarded as the effective date of individual taxable inflow (pen-
sion fund and direct insurance) or the period of benefit payment (direct
pension promise and support fund). This differentiation is due to the
historic development of the financing methods; in other words, it has
traditional instead of rational reasons.
Taxation of Direct Pension Promises
As has already been explained above, with regard to the employer com-
pany the accrual and disclosure of book reserves in the balance sheet
reduces the taxable profit and thereby the income tax burden (income
or corporate tax and tax on trading profits). However, due to the profit-
increasing effect of the dissolution of book reserves at the time of benefit
payment, this reduction of the income tax burden merely represents a
long-term tax deferment.
With regard to the employer the pension promise as such and the
allocations to the book reserves do not represent taxable income. Once
the benefits are being paid they are like wages, subject to income tax with
several tax-exempt allowances that can be claimed. These tax-exempt
amounts are the reason why the benefits are usually below the tax assess-
able limit. If the benefit is payable as a lump sum, it is fully subject to
income tax at the time of inflow. However, it is possible to distribute the
inflow over three years for tax purposes according to the Income Tax Act.
Taxation ofSupport Funds
For the parent company allocations to a support fund represent tax-
deductible business expenses within the limits set by the Income Tax Act.
The support funds themselves are exempt from corporation tax as well as
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from trade and wealth tax if the funds meet several conditions: if the
support fund has its own legal status; if beneficiaries have no legal entitle-
ment to benefits; if the fund is a social institution using its funds accord-
ing to its statutes; if beneficiaries must be able to advise on the admin-
istration of the assets; and if there are no employee contributions. If the
actual assets of the support fund at the end of the financial year are more
than 1.25 times higher than the maximum allowed assets, the excess is
subject to corporate, trade, and wealth tax.
With regard to the employee, the pensions from a support fund are
subject to income tax once they are actually received, analogous to the
benefits from a direct pension promise. The statements regarding lump
sum payments apply as well.
Taxation of Pension Funds
The contributions of the parent company to a pension fund are tax-
deductible without restrictions as business expenses as long as they are in
accordance with the statutes of the pension plan or are required to cover
deficits.
The pension funds themselves are tax-exempt if the same conditions
mentioned for support funds are fulfilled; nevertheless, it must be noted
that the maximum permitted assets are higher than for support funds
since the restrictions concerning allocations for active employees do not
apply. If the pension fund is overfunded, the surplus is subject to wealth
and trade taxes. In other words, the contributions are treated like in-
come of the pension fund. The tax liability can be revoked retroactively
by using the excess assets for certain specified purposes, for example, for
plan improvements.
For the employees, contributions are taxable, with the possibility of
applying a flat tax rate. This system is analogous to the direct insurance
approach described in more detail below. Of the benefits paid, only their
interest portion is taxable.
Taxation of Direct Insurance Plans
With regard to the employer, the premiums for a direct insurance plan
are iax-deductible as business expenses. Premiums are only non-deduct-
ible if the insurance was not installed for business reasons because of
the contractual relationship between employer and employee. The em-
ployer is not required to disclose the insurance claim as an asset in the
balance sheet, if the person on whose life the insurance has been taken
out or his or her survivors are fully or partially entitled to the insurance
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benefit at the end of the financial year. Raising a loan on the insurance
policy is possible without any adverse tax effects.
For the employees the contributions to direct insurance are regarded
as taxable income (because of the benefit entitlement an inflow is as-
sumed). The actual pension payments are only taxable on their interest
portion. The amount of the assumed interest portion depends on the age
of the beneficiary at the beginning of pension payment and has been
determined by law. A possible lump sum benefit remains tax-free as long
as the duration of the insurance exceeds 12 years and the contributions
have been accepted as additional expenses for tax purposes.
By agreement with the employer, contributions can be taxed with a flat
tax rate. However, this is restricted to a ceiling of US$ 1,820 per year per
employee. To allow for the benefit requirements of older employees this
ceiling can be raised to US$ 2,545 for an individual case, if the average of
all contributions for all employees covered by a direct insurance contract
or a pension fund does not exceed US$ 1,820. To calculate this average
any premiums or contributions ofmore than US$ 2,545 may not be taken
into accoun t. The application of the flat rate tax is permissible only if the
insurance benefit is not due before the attainment of age 60.5
Control and Insurance of Pension Risks
General Principles
As described above, the majority of pension assets in Germany (around
70 percent) are held within the company. Within limits this also applies
for use ofsupport funds as a financing method, which can be regarded as
external funding only with some reservations, since the support fund
does not give a legal entitlement to the benefits and the sponsoring
company is still ultimately liable for any pension payments. This becomes
particularly obvious if the support fund chooses to grant the company a
loan out of the allocated assets. Under these circumstances the pension
assets are again directly connected with the economic development of
the parent company. Consequently before 1974 it was possible to lose all
or part of the pension entitlement if the company became insolvent.
The Act on the Improvement ofOccupational Pensions introduced an
insolvency protection of pension entitlements in 1974 for all benefits
from direct pension promises, support funds, and direct insurance con-
tracts with a revocable claim (sections 7-15 BetrAVG).
Should the employer have pledged, assigned, or used the insurance
policy as collateral, even direct insurances with an irrevocable entitle-
ment are subject to insolvency insurance. In the event the insurance
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benefit is reduced because the employer did not pay all the premiums
required, this part is still not covered by insolvency protection, according
to a decision of the Federal Labor Court in 1992. Employees can decide
to pay the premiums temporarily themselves or even to continue the
policy with their own contributions. In any case, the contributions are
regarded as part of the employee's salary in order to define his or her
claim for compensation in case of bankruptcy and will be partially reim-
bursed by the labor bureau.
Benefits from pension funds are not subject to insolvency protection,
since the beneficiary is the policy holder. Further, pension funds, which
in Germany are always established as mutual insurance companies, are
subject to the supervision of the Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance
Companies. The fate of the pension entitlements, therefore, does not
depend on the sponsoring company.
The Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein as the Carrier of Insolvency
Insurance
According to section 14 BetrAVG, insolvency insurance is provided by the
Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein (PSVaG), a mutual insurance corporation. It
has the powers ofan institution of public administration. This means, for
example, that the contribution assessments of the PSVaG are acts of
administration and that a fine may be imposed on employers who do not
meet their legal duties concerning insolvency protection. These mea-
sures are intended to provide a high level of security for company pen-
sion benefits. The PSVaG does not pay the guaranteed occupational pen-
sions itself; it uses a consortium of74 life insurance companies (in 1992),
which share the annuity business purchased from between 14.5 percent
for the largest member of the consortium and 0.1 percent for the small-
est. Through this solution the risks can be spread efficiently.
Under section 7 BetrAVG, the obligation of the PSVaG in the case of
bankruptcy and in cases equal to bankruptcy are defined. These are the
following:
(a) rejection of petition in bankruptcy because ofno assets;
(b) institution of composition proceedings to avoid bankruptcy pro-
ceedings;
(c) settlement out of court after suspension of payments, only by for-
mal consent of the PSVaG;
(d) suspension of operations within the purview of the Act on the
Improvement of Occupational Pensions, if there was no petition
in bankruptcy or if the petition would be rejected because of no
assets;
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(e) serious economic difficulties similar to bankruptcy, only in cases
where a labor court or the PSVaG have agreed that entitlements
may be restricted or suspended.
It is of no importance who is to blame for the bankruptcy. Even if the
insolvency case is the consequence of criminal actions, the PSVaG is still
obliged to provide coverage. Further, the employees have a claim even if
their employer did not actually pay the PSVaG contributions legally due.
The purpose of this principle is to avoid the situation where the security
of employees' pension entitlements depends on whether the employer
has been respecting the law. In spite of this principle, employers normally
do pay the PSVaG contributions legally due, because fines can be im-
posed on those not paying punctually.
Benefits protected under insolvency insurance include pensions in
course of payment (but the PSVaG does not accept an earlier retirement
age than age 60) and pension entitlements that are already legally vested
at the time of bankruptcy. As far as pensions in course of payment are
concerned, the PSVaG has to cover the benefits from the moment of
bankruptcy on. Coverage for vested entitlements is due once the pen-
sionable incident has occurred. The PSVaG covers existing benefit en-
titlements by paying the single premium necessary to purchase annuity
contracts from the consortium oflife insurance companies.
Scope of Claims
In case of insolvency the PSVaG pays the beneficiaries a pension equal to
the benefit the employer would have had to pay according to the original
pension plan. However, the PSVaG will not adjust pensions according to
section 16 BetrAVG; instead, it has to apply any indexation clauses that
have been contractually fixed in the pension plan.
In the event that claims on the PSVaG represent an abuse under sec-
tion 7, paragraph 5 BetrAVG, it has no obligation to provide coverage. A
case of such abuse would be when improvements in the pension plan
made within the year preceding insolvency exceeded improvements
granted in the previous year. It should also be noted that the PSVaG is not
obliged to pay a monthly pension of more than three times the Social
Security Contribution Ceiling (three times US$ 4,606 in 1994).
Financing of the PSVaG
According to section 10 BetrAVG, employers are obliged under public
law to provide the necessary means to finance the insolvency insurance
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Contributions are related to the size of current
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TABLE 4 Development ofthe Pensions-Sicherung!i-Verein (PSVaG).
January 1. 1975-December 31.1992
Final Beneficiaries
Contri- Amount of Amount Receiving Beneficiaries
Members bution Contributions Insurance ofClaim Pension with vested
Financial (through &te (US$ Cases (US$ Payments Entitlements
Year Dec. 31) (%) millions) (no.) millions) (no.) (no.)
1975 31,045 1.5 67.0 249 45.3 5,060 7.290
1976 31,685 1.9 96.7 267 99.2 8,614 8.795
1977 32,102 1.9 103.6 246 77.7 4,745 5.808
1978 32,778 0.7 43.2 187 47.0 4,765 6.785
1979 32,518 1.1 72.1 154 77.3 5,346 8,116
1980 32,547 1.4 101.8 161 103.5 6.879 6,985
1981 33,895 2.0 163.0 246 167.8 11,780 13,228
1982 33,977 6.9 607.5 363 739.6 39,564 55,498
1983 33,746 3.7 333.8 322 313.3 10,689 14,992
1984 33,968 2.6 259.1 369 237.3 8,036 15,601
1985 34,622 1.4 160.8 366 230.0 7,461 9,746
1986 34,848 1.1 138.0 332 226.4 8,135 13,448
1987 35,725 1.8 289.6 307 355.0 15,891 19,873
1988 35.813 0.9 222.4 200 188.3 4,460 7,606
1989 36,051 0.6 86.3 173 170.0 4.943 7,872
1990 36,712 0.3 46.1 156 201.7 5.774 6,837
1991 37,282 0.9 137.5 155 238.9 6,170 6,561
1992 37,758 0.8 136.9 185 257.0 9,914 11,216
rotal 3,064.5 4,438 3,775.3 168,226 226,257
. Source: PSVaG (1993. p. 147).
benefits and pension entitlements. A uniform contribution rate applies
for all companies, not taking account ofany individual risks and thus only
insuring the abstract insolvency risk. The companies have to advise the
PSVaG about their individual assessment bases for contribution. The con-
tributions rate is then determined as the following fraction:
total c'lpital required
total of assessment bases of all companies
For example, the annual contribution rate was 0.19 percent in 1976 and
0.078 percent in 1992. The highest rate charged so far was 0.69 percent in
1982, as a result of the composition proceedings concerning a major
company in the electronics industry.
In 1992, 37,800 employers were contributing members of the PSVaG,
which covered 7.2 million pension entitlements, of which 2.9 million
were benefits in course of payment and 4.3 million were vested rights.
Since 1974 the PSVaG has had to cover obligations for 168,000 pen-
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sioners and 226,000 employees with vested entitlements (PSVaG 1993).
More detailed figures regarding the development of the PSVaG since
1975 are provided in Table 4.
State Guarantees
Should the PSVaG become unable to keep up its activities or should the
Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance Companies withdraw permis-
sion for its business activities - both highly unlikely events - the assets of
the PSVaG together with all its liabilities would be transferred by statutory
order to the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (Federal Bank for Compensation
Payments) .
General Principles to Ensure Investment Security in
Connection with Direct Insurance
Pension funds, like mutual insurance companies and life insurance com-
panies, are subject to the state supervision of the Federal Supervisory Of-
fice for Insurance Companies under the Insurance Control Act. In this
context, the fund's business plans have to be approved and the invest-
ment of funds is subject to the following principles:
(a) Security ofinvestrnent takes priority over yield;
(b) Profitability: appropriate returns must be ensured;
(c) Liquidity: the portfolio should be made up in such a way that there
is access to any necessary current assets at any time;
(d) Diversity: no investment may dominate the portfolio; and
(e) Securing of cover funds, e.g., by investing the means in real estate.
Every three years the insurance company has to submit for review by
the Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance Companies a balance sheet
specifically set up according to insurance principles.
Current Issues Regarding the Security and Future of
Occupational Pensions in Germany
The Situation of Occupational Pensions at Present
The present position of occupational benefits in Germany is marked by
continuing recession in the German economy. High additional wage
costs are too much for German companies in the current situation. Since
no legal obligation exists to provide company-sponsored pensions and
the introduction ofa company pension plan is therefore purely voluntary,
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companies are increasingly inclined to economize in the occupational
benefits area. This is manifest, for example, in the growing number of
pension plans that are closed to new entrants; that is, new employees en-
gaged after a fixed date no longer receive a pension promise. Further-
more companies are becoming reluctant to in troduce new pension plans.
According to a survey of the Ifo Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (In-
stitute for Economic Research) carried out on behalf of the Federal
Ministry of Labor in November 1993, the number of employees in the
industrial sector with a company pension promise has fallen from 70
percent in 1990 to 66 percent in 1993. This illustrates that the downward
trend of occupational pension provision observed since the end of the
1980s, particularly in the industrial sector, is continuing.
This phenomenon does not alarm the pension market. In view of the
continuing deep recession and the voluntary nature ofoccupational pen-
sions, the extent to which a reduction ofoccupational pensions has been
witnessed is surprisingly low. The extent of company-sponsored pensions
in the trade sector has only decreased from 29 percent of employees in
1990 - the highest level so far - to 28 percent in 1993. In all, occupa-
tional pensions have maintained their position as the leading company
benefit.
This leading role befits occupational pensions in Germany especially
because of their function as a supplement to social security, as illustrated
by the fact that the majority ofcompany retirement benefits is provided as
pension - as in the social security system - and not as lump sum payment.
As in other European countries, social security in Germany faces prob-
lems as increasing life expectancy and falling birth rates lead to an ag-
ing society and thus to a reduced contribution volume. The pay-as-you-
go system of financing social security is hardly able to cope with these
changes, a fact that has already necessitated reductions of benefits and
will do so again in the future. Consequently, the importance of occupa-
tional pensions as the second source of retirement income in Germany is
growing. This is reinforced by the fact that German reunification has
created an immense need of the state for capital, a substantial part of
which is recovered through high rates of taxes that render private retire-
ment accounts almost impossible.
The government is well aware of this situation and tries to avoid put-
ting pressure on the provision of occupational pensions by state mea-
sures. For example, in spring 1993 the government considered increas-
ing the legally fixed discount rate for book reserves from 6 percent to 7
percent. This increase would have reduced the annual allocations to
book reserves, leading to higher tax revenues for the state, but since it
would also have substantially increased the burden for companies with
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their company pension plans, the whole initiative was rejected in order to
avoid worsening the circumstances under which occupational pensions
are provided.
For German employees it is not only the issue of occupational benefit
provision as such that becomes more important because of the unfavor-
able developments in the social security system. What comes more and
more into focus is the security of pension assets and their independence
from the fate of the company, since the existence of many companies is
endangered by the continuing recession.
Insured Pensions Promises
The majority of occupational pensions in Germany are financed inter-
nally through book reserve accrual; thus, no assets are accrued externally
or available if the company becomes insolvent. In spite of this situation a
high degree ofsecurity of pension entitlements and pensions in course of
payment exists.
The distinctive and sophisticated system of insolvency protection pro-
vided by the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein effectively protects current pen-
sions and vested entitlements against the insolvency of the sponsoring
company. This German system has proved to be a success even in several
precarious cases. Not even the extensive composition proceedings con-
cerning a major company in the electronics industry in 1982 with claims
against the PSVaG of around US$ 576 million nor two other spectacular
insolvency cases of major steel companies in 1993 with claims of US$ 242
million each could make the system of insolvency protection totter.
Moreover, the system will be further improved as part of the reform of
the entire insolvency law that is currently under discussion in Parlia-
ment. Here, this reform will review the wording of the provisions of the
BetrAVG concerning insolvency protection and enhance the position of
the PSVaG as a creditor ofthe bankrupt's estate.
Entitlements Not Covered by Insolvency Insurance
Pension entitlements that are not yet legally vested are also protected by a
special system developed by the decisions of the labor courts. Contractual
pension promises once they are given can only be revoked or reduced by
the employer under very restricted circumstances. Basically, such mea-
sures are only permitted in the case of serious economic difficulties that
bring the company close to bankruptcy. In the case of the (partial) re-
vocation of existing pension promises because of such serious economic
difficulties, the employer has to bring in the PSVaG before the act of
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revocation, so that it can cover current pensions and vested entitlements.
In case of pension promises established by an agreement with the works
council, the possibilities of reducing the benefits are also very limited.
Such changes will be scrutinized as to their adequacy and have to be in
reasonable proportion to the reasons that caused them.
The Adjustment of Pensions in the Course of Payment
In Germany the current discussion regarding the security of company-
sponsored benefits also focuses on the provisions of section 16 BetrAVG,
which are intended to protect pension benefits against inflation. Follow-
ing the decision of the Federal Labor Court in 1992, which held that any
adjustments avoided on grounds of the economic situation of the com-
pany will have to be made up for at a later date, companies now face sub-
stantial financial burdens resulting from their pension plans. Additional
problems are due to the fact that the expenses for adjustments can gener-
ally not be allocated to the period actually causing them (i.e., the period
ofactive employment of the beneficiary), and thus be pre-financed, since
the decision about an adjustment and its extent is always taken after the
employee has left the company. This phenomenon of non-periodic pre-
financing is even more relevant in the case of retroactive adjustments, as
the company still has the accumulated adjustments before it.
As a result, discussion is underway to reduce the risk resulting from
retroactive adjustments, so that the circumstances under which company
benefits are provided do not deteriorate. In this context, an amendment
to section 16 BetrAVG has been proposed that would stipulate that an
adjustment of half the increase of the consumer price index would be
sufficient and that any lower adjustments for economic reasons would
not have to be made up for at a later date.
Occupational Pensions in the New Federal States
In the new federal states, occupational pension plans for the normal
workforce are very rare because of the economic situation of companies.
The introduction of a company pension plan is only reasonable once the
company starts making profits.
. Regional fiscal measures may be needed to facilitate the introduction
of occupational pensions in the new federal states after the reconstruc-
tion of the economy there. Such a measure could include a reduced
statutory discount rate for book reserve accrual that would provide tax
advantages for the companies. Nevertheless, these proposals remain in
the discussion stage at present.
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The Success of Book Reserves
In view of the tax advantages granted to companies with pension plans, it
has repeatedly been argued that Germany as a stock exchange location is
heavily disadvantaged due to the book reserve system. However, the Ger-
man system of book reserve financing has proven its worth. On the one
hand, it would not be possible to separate capital accumulated for pen-
sion purposes from the company since it is mainly invested in internal
fixed assets. On the other hand, it is not regarded as a disadvantage at all
that due to the lack of separated assets there are no large pension funds
that could dominate and influence the capital market and indirectly
through this currency policy. Nor is the argument that book reserve
financing is nothing more than an indirect subsidy to companies con-
vincing. Here it is easily overlooked that the book reserve system fits
smoothly with the German tax system and indeed has been created by it.
Thus, according to the German tax system a separation of pension assets
from the company would be immediately subject to tax, which is not the
case in other countries.
The German system of book reserve financing has proved to be such a
success that Germany's European neighbor countries have shown an
interest in adopting the system.
European Integration: Tendencies and Outlook
The Progress of European Integration and Possible Effects on
Insolvency Insurance
The trend seems to indicate that occupational pension systems will be
increasingly influenced by European regulations and measures. How-
ever, national systems of insolvency protection always depend on the
character and rules of their own national labor and tax laws. The defini-
tion of what are appropriate instruments for insolvency protection is
particularly influenced by the way benefits are financed. If "internal fi-
nancing" through book reserves is used, as in Germany, the safety of
these funds will depend solely on the economic fate ofthe company.
In the course of European integration, unnecessary restrictions in the
area of occupational pensions will likely be eliminated by the process of
liberalization and deregulation. To achieve this goal, the European Com-
mission presented a draft proposal in October 1991, the so-called "Pen-
sion Funds Directive," but this has not yet been passed by the European
Council of Ministers because of the different approaches of the Euro-
pean member states.
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The objective of this directive is to ease cross-border services relating to
the investment and administration of pension fund assets. This would
enable the institutions covered by the Pension Funds Directive - in Ger-
many, the pension funds and support funds - that a company and its
subsidiaries have in different countries of the European Community to
pursue the joint investment and administration of all pension fund as-
sets, within an overall investment strategy.
The effects of this draft proposal could possibly have an indirect influ-
ence on insolvency insurance policy in Germany. Benefits from direct
insurance with an irrevocable entitlement of the employee, which are not
pledged or used as collateral by the employer, as well as benefits from
pension funds, are to date not subject to insolvency insurance in Ger-
many. In each case the pension claim is independent of the economic
fate of the company, and life insurance companies as well as pension
funds are bound by the strict investment regulations of the Insurance
Control Act. The result is a high degree of safety for pension entitle-
ments. Under the draft Pension Funds Directive, these strict investment
regulations would be considerably relaxed and thereafter the systematic
supervision of investment decisions would be completely dropped (Arti-
cle 4 of the draft Pension Fund Directive).
For life insurance companies, the strict requirements of the German
Insurance Control Act are significantly relaxed by the 1992 Third Life
Insurance Directive, which is headed toward national law. It provides that
actuarial assumptions be no longer rigidly fixed. Further, it will abolish
the approval procedure for rates and conditions, to be replaced by the
principle of "single license," according to which only the single admis-
sion of the local (national) insurance supervision authority is necessary
for a life insurance company to be able to offer the full range of its
approved products throughout the European Community without hav-
ing to set up an establishment in other member states. This might lead to
an expansion of insolvency insurance obligations to irrevocable benefits
from direct insurance that are not pledged or used as collateral and from
pension funds, since pension entitlements based upon the liberal invest-
ment possibilities enjoyed by insurance companies and pension funds
may no longer be considered sufficiently secure. In the long term, this
could result in an increase in the contribution volume for the PSVaG.
-Considerations regarding cross-border membership in occupational
pension plans and the free movement oflabor could also result in changes
to the German insolvency insurance system. The existing vesting provi-
sions are regarded by the Commission as a particular obstacle to the free
movement of labor. However, reduced vesting periods would lead to an
expansion of insolvency insurance, since in Germany under the provi-
sions of the Act on the Improvement of Occupational Pensions only
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pensions in course of payment and vested rights are covered in cases of
insolvency, leaving a considerable number of pension entitlements, that
is, those that have not yet fulfilled the vesting period of 10 years, without
the protection of the insolvency insurance carrier.
In all probability the expansion of insolvency insurance would result in
an increase in the assessment bases. In this connection an essential fea-
ture of German insolvency insurance is the link to the tax law stipulation
that book reserves can only be accrued from the age of 30. In the event
that this age qualification were to be reduced to the European standard,
some increase of premiums for insolvency insurance might take place,
since pension entitlements could be acquired to a greater extent and, for
reasons of employee protection, would probably have to be covered by
the insolvency insurance. But such an increase would probably not be too
far-reaching. Hence, no further and negative effects on the occupational
pensions market are to be feared.
Equal Treatment: Decisions of the European Court ofJustice
In the so-called 1990 Barber Judgment, the European Court ofJustice
ruled that different retirement ages for men and women in occupational
pension systems violate Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and are there-
fore inadmissible. Irrespective of when the statutory pension is paid, the
employer may not differentiate between men and women as regards
retirement age or the amount of the benefit. If the employer differenti-
ates, a man can claim to be treated like a woman. Regarding the retroac-
tive effect of this decision the European Court ofJustice has supported
the view that legal relationships already concluded will not be affected.
Belgian Advocate General van Gerven rendered his decision on four
pension cases (using the BarberJudgment) in early 1993. In all four cases
his opinion was that the Barber Judgment should have no retroactive
effect. Further, the adjustment of retirement ages could be achieved by
reducing the retirement age of the disadvantaged sex to the retirement
age of the advantaged sex. However, deviating procedures should be
allowed. The Advocate General spoke in favor of unisex rates for insur-
ance purposes, but also not with retroactive effect. However, later in 1993
the European Court ofJustice ruled in Neath v. Hugh Sleeper Ltd. that the
use of sex-based actuarial factors in funded defined benefit schemes is
not contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome.
The decision on the Ten Dever case was given on October 6,1993. In its
judgment the European Court ofJustice gave an affirmative answer to the
question of whether occupational survivors' pensions represent remu-
neration in the sense of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and that this
finding has no retroactive effect on periods before May 17, 1990.
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The Moroni case was decided by the European Court of Justice on
December 14, 1993. The male plaintiff, who was the beneficiary of a
German occupational pension plan, claimed that under Article 119 of
the Treaty ofRome he was entitled to a company pension from age 60 on,
as female employees in the same situation would be. The European Court
ofJustice held that the definition of different retirement ages for men
and women in additional pension plans remains contrary to Article 119
even if this difference is in accordance with the national social security
system. Further, the Court decided that in this case the European Com-
munity directive 86/378 of July 24, 1986 "On the principle of equal
treatment in occupational social security systems" does not conflict with
the direct and immediate assertion of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome
before national courts.
Under Article 8 of this directive the member states must initiate steps
to ensure that all provisions of occupational pension plans that violate
the principle of equal treatment were amended before January I, 1993.
Thus, the European Court ofJustice argued that Article 119 of the Treaty
of Rome is directly applicable to any kind of discrimination that can be
established according to the criteria of Article 119, and that directive
86/378 cannot restrict the consequences ofArticle 119.
In addition, the Court repeated its decision that equal treatment re-
garding occupational benefits can only be claimed for benefits resulting
from employment periods after May 17, 1990 (BarberJudgment).
In respect of equal treatment, German vesting periods could probably
become an issue again. The requirement of attainment of age 35 to-
gether with the IG-year service period could be regarded as indirect
discrimination against women, since women quit or interrupt their em-
ployment careers much more frequently for family reasons.
Cross-Border Employment
In the meantime the European Commission has approached separately
the issue of employee cross-border membership in occupational pension
plans, a subject excluded from the draft Pension Fund Directive because
acceptance did not seem possible at the time. Therefore in October 1992
the Commission presented a "working paper on cross-border member-
ship of occupational pension plans for migrant workers." At present this
working paper focuses only on the group of migrant workers. They are
defined as employees who are employed by the same employer or group
of employers in another country and who wish to remain in the occupa-
tional pension system of their home country.6 It should be noted that all
these considerations only concern a relatively small group of employees
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within the European Community, since according to the paper the num-
ber of migrant workers is not more than 260,000.
Conclusion
The provision of retirement income in Germany is based on three pillars:
social security, private retirement accounts, and company-sponsored
pensions. The expected worsening of the ratio of active employees to
pensioners in the social security area will lead in the long term to a sta-
bilization of benefits on a lower level. Hence, in view of the very limited
possibilities for tax-efficient private provisions, the provision ofcompany-
sponsored benefits will become an even more important issue of social
policy-as it is in a European context. Unlike the practice in other Euro-
pean countries, occupational pensions are provided in Germany on a
voluntary basis. They are regarded, therefore, as an additional source of
income.
Internal unfunded financing through book reserves is the dominating
financing method, mainly for historical reasons, and has proved to be a
success despite criticism. Apart from the chosen financing method, labor
and tax law issues are of crucial importance. Also of considerable signifi-
cance is the protection of benefits in the event of insolvency, since inter-
nal financing depends on the economic health of the company. The
process of European integration also has an influence on national law,
for example, regarding equal treatment ofmen and women, cross-border
employment, and insurance control. Financially, the reunification of
Germany imported serious economical problems. Because the introduc-
tion of a company pension plan is only reasonable once the company
makes profits, pension plans for regular workers are very rare.
Notes
IThroughout this chapter all Deutschmark sums are converted into U.S. dollar
figures at US$ 1.00 = 1.65 OM.
2For further information see Ahrend and Jumpertz (1995) and Ahren, Foers-
ter, and Roessler (1993).
'There are nevertheless some companies - in particular, subsidiaries of U.S.
multinationals - that prefer to hold assets that correspond to the book reserve
accrual. These are usually companies that have no need to fund their business
other than through equity and earnings; in the case of U.S. multinationals, there
can be tax and other financial reasons for having a "funded" pension plan.
Traditionally, the asset most commonly used to back pension liabilities has been
an insurance contract, which will provide the necessary cash to the company to
pay the pension when it falls due. However, portfolios of stocks and bonds may
also be used. Such portfolios can be especially attractive for U.S. multinationals.
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which are more used to such investments for pension plans. Normally, the asset
would not be tied legally to the book reserve or pension promise; thus the com-
pany remains free to disinvest the asset at any time. From a United States tax and
legal perspective, such a pension plan would not be regarded as truly funded.
Under section 404A of the Internal Revenue Code, this can have a negative
impact on the U.S. parent of a German subsidiary. A solution to this problem
would be to create a legal framework around the asset such tbat it is protected for
the sole purpose of paying employees' pensions. This is done by pledging the
assets to a fiduciary, an arrangement that comes as close as possible to the English
Law concept of a trust. It should be noted, however, that for German accounting
and tax purposes the assets would remain the commercial property of the com-
pany. The German tax deduction is obtained exclusively through the book re-
serve accrual, as before.
'A support fund also has the option to obtain the financial means for future
benefit payments through the conclusion of reinsurances. If this involves annual
premiums (not a single premium) the parent company can fully reimburse the
support fund for these premiums under section 4d EStG, even if the premium
exceeds the maximum possible annual allocations. In such a case the normal
allocations have to be reduced by the ratio of the reinsured benefits to all bene-
fits. A reinsured support fund as a form of "outside funding" combines the
possibility of pre-financing benefits completely, without the tax problems arising
with direct insurance or pension funds, with the easy "handling" of a support
fund since no regulations concerning investment, control of the management, or
accounting have to be observed.
'Interest received is generally regarded as taxable income. Under section 20
EStG interest from savings accounts is taxable as income from capital. Mter allow-
ing for expenses, interest of up to US$ 3,635 for single persons and US$ 7,270 for
married persons is tax-free each year. Any interest received above these ceilings is
fully subject to income tax.
6Although the introduction of general regulations for cross-border member-
ship in occupational retirement systems for employees working abroad is regarded
as hardly realizable because of the different backgrounds in taxation, the paper
concludes that a special regulation should be considered concerning a "mutual
recognition for supervision and taxation purposes." This would mean that contri-
butions from the country of employment would be tax-<:leductible on the same
basis applicable for equivalent retirement systems in the country of employment.
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Comments by Lucy apRoberts
My discussion of Peter Ahrend's chapter seeks to raise a few essential
points of comparison for the pension systems of Germany, France, and
the United States. The first two sections pinpoint the most "foreign"
aspects of the German and the French systems from a U.S. point of view,
namely book reserve financing in Germany and "complementary retire-
ment plans" in France. The last section comments briefly on the U.S.
retirement system from a German or a French perspective.
One obstacle to understanding a foreign social welfare system is the
fact that what is politically or culturally acceptable in one country may be
considered unacceptable in another. A negative value judgment on an
aspect of a foreign system can impede understanding how it functions.
German book reserve financing may be considered a case in point. In the
United States (or in Britain), only financing through a pension fund is
considered acceptable for company pension plans. Book reserve financ-
ing is frowned upon and is considered as inappropriate as any type of
pay-as-you-go financing. It is, however, widely accepted in Germany, as
Ahrend points out.
Another obstacle to comprehension is the fact that foreign systems can
be based on concepts that do not exist in one's own country. When one
first approaches a foreign system, it is natural to project concepts and
categories that apply to one's own system onto the unfamiliar one. Ameri-
can retirement plans covering private sector employees are generally
classified into two categories: social security and employer-based (or what
the British call "occupational") or, alternatively, public and private. In
France, much of the retirement income of private sector employees is
provided through what the French call regimes de retraite complimentaires or
complementary retirement plans. These plans are not part of the social se-
curity system and yet they are not exactly employer-based, at least not in
the sense in which Americans usually employ the term. They do not fit
into the U.S. classification system.
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German Book ReseNes
Peter Ahrend has written an excellent description ofcompany-sponsored
pension plans in Germany. Not only does he discuss legal and economic
aspects of the system; he also touches on the history that has shaped it.
He points out that accrual of book reserves is the most widespread fi-
nancing method for company plans in Germany, accounting for almost
60 percent of total pension plan reserves.
In this method, the sponsoring company accrues book reserves corre-
sponding to the present value of pension promises as liabilities on its
balance sheet. As benefits become due, the company pays them out from
its assets and the book reserves are drawn down. The term "funding" is
generally used to refer to financing through a fund that is separate from
the sponsoring employer's books and that invested largely outside the
sponsoring company. By this definition, book reserve financing is not a
form of funding. But does this mean that many German company plans
operate on a pay-as-you-go basis? It depends on how the term is defined.
If by "pay-as-you-go" one means a system where benefits are financed as
they come due, without anticipation offuture expense, then the German
system is somewhat different.
The main difficulty of financing a defined benefit plan that covers a
restricted group of employees, such as those of a single company, resides
in fluctuations in the ratio of pensions being paid out relative to other
labor costs. This problem is particularly acute during the long period of
steady increase in pension expense that follows the creation of a plan, a
period that spans a number of decades. The rise in pension expense is
due to the increase over time in the number of retired employees who
have qualified for pensions and to the fact that each new cohort of re-
tirees has generally built up more pension rights than previous ones. l
If a new plan is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, the cost in each
period will be equal to the pensions actually paid out, and this expense
will rise steadily relative to other costs, notably labor costs, until the plan
matures. Companies operating in a competitive environment cannot
normally afford to meet such a mounting cost; they need to level out
pension costs over time, so that they become more or less constant rela-
tive to other expenses. The German book reserve system allows com-
'panies to do this: like a U.S. company with a funded plan, a German
company makes actuarial forecasts of pension expense and accrues lia-
bilities of a size adequate to finance this future expense. This technique
allows the company to smooth out costs over time.
The book reserve system could be interpreted as a form of fund-
ing with an extreme asset allocation (Altman 1992; Frijns and Petersen
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1988); it is as though the plan held only bonds issued by the sponsor-
ing company. In a funded plan, the adequacy of financing depends on
returns obtained on external markets; in the case of a plan financed
through book reserves, the adequacy of financing depends on returns
obtained by the company on its own capital. As Peter Ahrend does in his
chapter, one could refer to book reserve financing and funding as two
forms of "pre-financing" of pensions, to distinguish them from pay-as-
you-go.
One objection to book reserve financing is that employee pension
rights are not protected in the event of bankruptcy. In theory, funding
insures against this problem: in the event of bankruptcy, the pension
fund is used to payout what is due to former employees. In a book reserve
system, only whatever assets remain to the company can be used to cover
pension obligations. The Germans have dealt with this problem through
an obligatory national insolvency insurance system. This system is similar
in many ways to the U.S. insolvency insurance system, and in fact the two
were set up in the same year, 1974.
The fact that both countries have insolvency insurance might give
pause to those who object that book reserve financing is riskier than
funding: in reality, the security of pension rights in funded plans can be
endangered by bankruptcy. The assets of a pension fund can fall short of
what is required to cover pensions due, either because the sponsoring
company has failed to set aside sufficient reserves or because of poor
returns or actual losses on investments. When applied to defined benefit
plans, the term "funded" is in fact quite vague. It refers to the existence
ofa fund, but it does not define the relationship between the value of the
fund and plan commitments. It might be interesting to compare benefits
paid out to retirees by the two national insolvency insurance systems as
compared to total benefits paid out by insured plans in the two countries
since 1974. Such a study could be a way of measuring which of the two
financing methods has proven the most secure up until now.
In the book reserve system, a pension plan generates resources for the
sponsoring company. It may be claimed that this system is too risky for
employees, who are putting all their eggs in one basket. However, ifa plan
contributes to the prosperity of the employer, a prosperity that in turn
ensures the future not only of pensions but also of wages and employ-
ment, it may not be such a bad basket for them to put their eggs in. Peter
Ahrend points out that this pattern often applies in Germany even when
financing methods other than book reserves are used: "support funds"
may make loans to the sponsoring company; "pension funds" may invest
in the company within certain limits; "direct insurance" may be used as
collateral on loans to the company. Employees covered by a defined
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benefit pension plan could be considered to have made a kind of loan. In
a book reserve system, they lend to their own employer; in the U.S. (or
British) funded system, they lend to capital markets.
The commitments the employer makes to employees in a German plan
financed through book reserves and in a U.S. defined benefit plan fi-
nanced through a pension fund are more similar than appears at first
glance. In setting up a defined benefit plan, an employer in either coun-
try makes a promise to employees concerning benefits, but not concern-
ing financing. In Germany, the plan is often financed through company
assets. In the United States, there must be a pension fund, but the plan is
in fact backed up by the assets of the company. Should the pension fund
fall short of the needs of the plan, the employer has a commitment to
make up the difference.
Why do German and U.S. companies use different financing methods?
The answer lies largely in fiscal policy: German companies can write off
book reserve accruals for pension plans from their taxes and U.S. com-
panies cannot. However, this answer only begs the question, because then
one must ask why the tax systems differ. The explanation lies partly in his-
torical factors. Peter Ahrend explains that the book reserve system be-
came common following the Second World War. Tax rates imposed by
the allied forces on company profits were high and companies had great
difficulty obtaining capital: the banking sector was devastated, financial
markets were inoperative, and firms could not obtain capital abroad.
With encouragement from the state through tax exemptions, book re-
serves proved an efficient method of self-financing for many companies;
they were able to raise capital internally without having to resort to is-
suing stock or borrowing. In 1986, pension reserves represented some
16 percent of total balance sheet liabilities of the 184 largest German
corporations (Reynaud 1992). Generally, pension plan reserves consti-
tute a large proportion of the balance sheet liabilities of many German
corporations.
Cultural as well as historical factors may help to account for differences
between the German and the U.S. system. German corporations seem to
have a general dislike for financing through issuing securities. In addi-
tion, in the United States, it may be that employees - and unions - have
little faith that employers will make good on pension promises. Financing
through a fund invested outside the sponsoring company protects em-
ployees to some extent from the employer going back on the pension
promise. The U.S. system originated at a time when funding was encour-
aged by tax law, but not obligatory. When unions exerted sufficient in-
fluence, as did the United Auto Workers, for example, they sometimes
insisted on employers building up adequate reserves. Differences in pen-
sion plan financing may also be linked to differences in the industrial
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relations systems of the two countries. Through works councils and the
system of codetermination, German employees generally have more of a
say in how companies are run than U.S. employees do. Perhaps the fact
that German employees often contribute to company finances through
their pension plans gives them - and their employers - some sense that
they have a right to a say in company policy.
Finally, it is important to remember that the German social security
retirement system is far more generous, especially at higher salary levels,
than the U.S. (or the British) system. It is explicitly designed to maintain
employees' standard of living during retirement and replacement rates
are generally quite high. Hence, for most employees covered by company
plans, the company pension is only icing on the cake; the cake is their
social security pension.
French Complementary Plans
The French retirement system is similar to Germany's in that nation-wide,
pay-as-you-go plans provide most employees with pensions that are quite
generous in relation to their salaries. It guarantees most employees with
full careers a replacement rate of70 percent or more of net salary, that is,
salary after deduction ofpayroll taxes (Reynaud 1994). What is intriguing
about the French system is that employers and labor unions have set up
"complementary plans" that are similar to social security in some re-
spects and yet are private institutions. Company plans are rare and pro-
vide very little retirement income. The complementary plans are not part
of social security, nor are they employer-based, at least in the U.S. sense.
As in the case of the German book reserve system, some historical
background is necessary to understand French complementary retire-
ment plans. The French social security retirement system, which was set
up at the end of World War II, levies contributions and pays out benefits
that are more or less proportional to earnings under a ceiling that is a
little above the average wage.2 In 1947, the national employers' organiza-
tion and the labor union confederations signed a collective bargaining
agreement creating a national complementary plan: this plan pays out
supplementary benefits to private-sector cadres, that is, high-level white-
collar employees. This plan, called AGIRC (Association cenhale des
Institutions de Retraites des Cadres), collects contributions from employ-
ers and employees on salary above the social security ceiling and pays out
benefits that are proportional to that salary bracket.
Many cadres had previously been covered by company or sectorial
pension plans that had broken down during the War. The new plan paid
out pensions on the basis of past service to retiring cadres as soon as it was
created (Friot 1994). This measure was designed to compensate them at
110 Comments
least partially for the disappearance of their former plans. It was possible
because the financing was basically pay-as-you-go.
Originally, AGIRC covered only employees of companies that were
members of the national employers' organization, but in 1950 the state
made affiliation obligatory for all cadres through a legal process that is
quite common in France under which a collective bargaining agreement
may be made mandatory for employers who have not actually signed.
Little by little, complementary plans covering other employees were
set up in the 1950s and '60s, some by individual companies and some
through industry-wide collective bargaining (Lynes 1985). These plans
levy contributions from employers and employees from the first franc of
salary and payout benefits proportional to salary. In 1961, they formed a
federation called ARRCO (Association des Regimes de Retraites Comple-
mentaires). By 1972, collective bargaining agreements had made affilia-
tion mandatory for non-cadres in most sectors, and many cadres had also
become affiliated. In 1972, legislation required that practically all private-
sector non-cadre employees be affiliated to an ARRCO plan. By 1976,
affiliation had become obligatory for all cadres, who pay in contributions
and receive benefits on the basis of their salaries under the social security
ceiling. Over time, the different plans in ARRCO have gradually unifor-
mized their contribution rates and benefits and pooled their resources,
so that today the federation functions practically like one large national
pension plan covering all employees.
Together, ARRCO and AGIRC payout around one-third of total pri-
vate-sector retirees' pensions, the rest coming from social security. To
draw a parallel with the U.S. private pension system, the French com-
plementary retirement system is something like two nation-wide multi-
employer plans: one for all employees and one restricted to the upper
echelons. Like U.S. multi-employer plans, the complementary plans were
created through collective bargaining and they are jointly run by labor
union and employer representatives.
The complementary plans have some reserves, but their financing is
basically pay-as-you-go. Technically, the plans could have built up much
larger reserves, but employers and unions decided in favor of pay-as-you-
go financing for a number of reasons. Because financing is quite cen-
tralized, there was some fear that large reserves would become the object
.of controversy over how the funds were invested and who was to control
them. In addition, unions tended to be wary of funding, feeling that it
would lead them to participate too closely in the capitalist system. Both
employers and unions wanted to keep contribution rates down. Employ-
ers in particular felt it would be better to keep money in companies by
keeping contributions down rather than building up reserves.
Pay-as-you-go financing enabled complementary plans to payout bene-
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fits on the basis of past service from their creation. From its inception,
AGIRC paid out pensions on the basis of past service to retiring cadres.
When companiesjoined ARRCO, newly retiring employees received ben-
efits on the basis of their whole careers with the company, even before
their affiliation. This policy offered a certain advantage for financing: it
did not take the plans very long to mature, and contribution rates, while
high at first, have stayed relatively level; expenses rose over a shorter
period of time than would have been the case if the system had not paid
out benefits for past service.
There are probably a number of cultural attitudes that can help to
explain the French complementary plan system. France generally has a
highly centralized political system and its welfare system - even its private
component- has become centralized as well. The French also have-or
have had - a certain mistrust of financial markets, especially following
the period between the two world wars, when inflation wiped out finan-
cial assets. It may also be that French employees are loathe to trust their
employers to make good on pension promises, so that a national system is
perhaps better suited to their expectations. Finally, employers in many
industries may have wanted to avoid competition on the basis of labor
costs; a national system helps to make them uniform.
The French complementary plans are private institutions, but they are
national in scope. In fact, they have come to resemble a sort of second tier
of the social security system. The security of their benefits depends on
much the same factors as social security pensions. What is extraordinary
is the way in which they were set up. Many employers, as well as labor
unions, pushed for their creation and expansion. In most other coun-
tries, employers have opposed expansion ofnational retirement coverage
and have fought to maintain their own, company-based pension plans.
In recent years, there has been much discussion about encouraging
the creation of voluntary company pension plans in France. Some such
plans do exist, but tax exemptions are not very generous. There is debate
over whether financing should be only through funding or if tax exempt
book reserves should also be authorized, as in Germany. Some current
legislative proposals offer both options.
The United States as Compared to France and Germany
Compared to the U.S. retirement system, the French and German retire-
ment systems are quite similar in that, in both countries, the vast bulk of
old age pensions come from national, pay-as-you-go systems. Company
plans are rare in France. They are more widespread in Germany, but
provide only about 10 percent of private sector employees' retirement
pensions (Reynaud 1992). In the United States, social security pensions
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are much smaller and employer-based plans payout much more on aver-
age to retired employees who qualify to receive them.
The other characteristic that distinguishes the United States is the way
in which social security pensions are calculated: the U.S. system is ex-
plicitly skewed in favor of low wage earners. In other words, it is some-
where between an earnings-related and a flat rate system. The German
and French systems are not particularly redistributive on the basis of
salary level: contributions and benefits are to a large extent propor-
tional to salary; the two systems are basically earnings-related. They both
evolved from less generous, more flat rate systems. The 1945 French
system only paid out pensions equivalent to part of income under a
ceiling; gradually, employers and unions fashioned a second tier of com-
plementary plans that makes the present-day system comes close to pro-
viding a uniform total replacement rate (except for the very highly paid).
Peter Ahrend refers in his paper to a major change in the German system
in the 1950s. Previously, the social security system was designed to provide
subsistence income for retired workers. When reform legislation was
passed in 1957, the system's objective became to maintain beneficiaries'
standard ofliving in retirement.
Americans often tend to assume that social security systems elsewhere
are like their own, that is, that they pay out relatively small pensions,
especially to highly paid wage earners. Germany and France, like many
other countries in continental Europe, have a different tradition. Their
retirement systems provide universal coverage that allows most retirees to
come close to maintaining the standard of living they enjoyed during
their careers.
Notes
I If a plan grants full retroactive rights at the outset, that is, rights for service
completed before the plan was set up, the pensions of the first cohorts of retirees
will be as large as those of later ones in proportion to their salaries. In this case,
the period ofmaturation of the plan, that is, the time it takes for pension expense
to level off (assuming stable salaries and a stable population of covered workers),
will be shorter.
'In October 1993, the social security ceiling was 12,610 F per month, while the
average monthly gross wage (before deduction of payroll taxes) in the private
sector was 11 ,079 F.
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Comments by Marc M. Twinney
Most national private pension systems appear to be similar from country
to country. The points in the German system that are different from the
United States system are more numerous and important than with other
countries. This makes it intriguing to study and compare the German
system with the U.S. system.
Once a system is established, it is difficult to imagine whether any other
choices might have been possible. When a pension system first comes
into being, many choices may be open. Early choices are especially cru-
cial, because they determine the basic structure. Whether a pension sys-
tem will continue to change depends on the degree to which this struc-
ture reconciles what makes all the parties feel secure with what they
consider equitable.
In the United States, a primary thrust for future change in defined
benefit plans seems to revolve around the degree that underfunded
plans can be accepted in the system of guarantees. The more common
the features of the pension world become, the more likely that under-
funded pensions will be unacceptable inside or outside the United States.
This thrust could drive change in German pensions as well.
A second thrust for change worldwide will be to achieve cost effective-
ness in the system. Low cost is a primary characteristic of quality in a
system that, after all, only stores capital to be used at a later age. Low cost
can be used to add more coverage, improve benefits, or reinvest in the
economy to support other worthwhile goals that do not require funding,
or permit funding that qualifies for tax deduction under u.s. rules. More
about such rules later.
My discussion will focus on the few points of similarity between the
United States system and the German system in order to understand
better the points of difference. These points of difference are the ones
most likely to be subject to change in the future, as the European commu-
nity and North America become more closely integrated economically.
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The Importance of Funding
Firms in the United States would prefer to fund their pension plan obli-
gations externally for many reasons. These reasons have strengthened in
recent years.
The traditional reason offered to explain why external funding is desir-
able is that it provides security that pension funds will be available to pay
the benefits long term. This is, of course, the most important reason for
participants, their representatives, the benefit guarantee system, and the
public at large.
Other reasons for the firm to fund externally are to relieve future
management of the burden of heavy cash outflows at some future time,
to reduce the size of unfunded liabilities disclosed under U.S. account-
ing standards, and to improve the after-tax profit effect of accrued ac-
counting for pensions. It is worth mentioning that the desire to reduce
unfunded liabilities is not solely to make corporate financial statemen ts
look better, but also to achieve better credit ratings and lower the firm's
cost of borrowing. Similarly, once the return on a diversified pension
portfolio approaches or surpasses the firm's cost of capital, the profit
effect turns positive. Note that funding the pension plan is a money-
losing proposition at the margin if the investments are restricted to fixed
income securities, because their performance is inferior both to equity
returns and to the cost of capital long term. In some firms, the expected
returns on investments in new product are cited as the breakeven for
funding. Unfortunately, these returns are difficult to project. Further,
the hurdle rates are often set at a high level to allow for variation in
projections and to avoid projects whose returns could bring the firm's
total return to a level below the cost of capital. As such, these rates
are arbitrary and not the correct point to judge returns for pension
funding.
Given the reasons for U.S. firms to fund externally, it is not surprising
that their German subsidiaries are overrepresented among the funded
alternatives and underrepresented in the unfunded book reserve alter-
natives. This means that German-based firms and, probably, non-U .S.
multinationals, will tend to be overrepresented in the unfunded book
reserve category.
In the September 2, 1993 Wall StreetJournal article "Hopeful Assump-
tions Let Firms Minimize Pension Contributions" by Susan Pulliam, U.S.
and non-U.S. underfunded pension obligations were added together for
major U.S. multinationals. This was the first time this had occurred in the
business press. Initial reaction of the listed firms was defensive, explain-
ing that the results included overseas plans that were not required to be
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funded, but the article started new thinking inside and outside com-
panies about the potential offunding the obligations worldwide.
German Practice
Many German firms have used an internal fund in the firm to support the
book reserve or to diversifY the investments of the direct insurance/ pen-
sion fund arrangements. These "Spezialfonds" were begun in 1968. They
have many points in common with the investment forms of a United
States mutual fund and even some in common with United States pen-
sion trusts and ERISA. Some of the German investment law requirements
include the following. (1) Only securities listed on stock exchanges may
be used; this excludes notes and any unlisted securities and real estate.
(2) Cash cannot exceed 50 percent of the assets. (3) All securities and
cash must be held by a depository bank. (4) No more than 5 percent of
the assets may be invested in a single issue. (5) No more than 5 percent of
a single issue may be purchased. (6) Fund assets must be segregated from
those of the management company and not be liable for any claims
against the latter. (7) Shares in the fund must be redeemable at any time
at net asset value. (8) The funds are regulated by the Federal Banking
Authority.
The special funds also enjoy certain limited tax advantages. Transac-
tions are not subject to sales tax, dividends and interest may be received
free of withholding tax, the deferral of taxation applies to income from
foreign as well as domestic sources, and capital gains are not taxed. These
tax advantages do not equal that of the U.S. qualified plan nor of the
invested insurance reserves, but they do apply to a higher-yielding, diver-
sified portfolio ofequities.
For German firms, these internal funds combined with the book
reserve tax deduction begin to approach the cost effectiveness of the
United States system. The German system is more complex because the
tax deduction depends upon the tax calculation, "Teilwert," not on
the amount offunds set aside. Because the firm is the beneficial owner of
the special fund, it would be accessible to the firm's creditors.
For U.S. firms, the special funds in Germany fall short of what is
needed for a funded plan. They are not treated as a funded plan under
. United States taxation in the consolidated return, and equally disadvan-
tageous, they are not considered as a plan asset under U.S. accounting
standards.
In an effort to counter these shortcomings, a new development spon-
sored by United States multinationals has been to add security provisions
based on the U.S. pension law to the special funds in Germany. These
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contractual provisions emulate the requirements ofERISA and U.S. pen-
sion trusts. This development could become very important to United
States firms if it solves the twin taxation and accounting problems that
are specific to U.S.-based firms, but not to German-based firms. The
reporting effect is taking on greater importance, as mentioned above, in
the news media and credit ratings.
One of the issues in taxation is whether the provisions can be made
tight enough to perfect the arrangement under U.S. requirements for
exclusive benefit without setting off the taxation of the individual partici-
pants under local law in Germany as the funds are contributed.
There are a number of differences between the book reserve calcu-
lations for tax deductions and the U.S. calculations performed for U.S.
accounting and tax purposes. There are also differences between the
tax calculations allowed in the United States return for non-U.S. re-
serve plans. These issues include whether all benefits or only vested
benefit accruals are included, the interest rate assumption, the pro-
jection of final average salary, the provision for subsidized early retire-
ment, the extent to which mandated post-retirement benefit increases
are projected, amortization periods for benefit amendments, changes
in measurement methods and assumptions, and experience gains and
losses.
Some of these differences mean that the German tax deduction
method falls short of the need for a United States valuation for U.S.
deductions or for the U.S. accounting standards.
Difficulties of Funding in Germany
A recent tax development in the United States is developing into a sulr
stantial problem for U.S. firms operating outside the United States. The
problem came to a head in 1993 when the Internal Revenue Service
proposed a regulation that combined the ERISA requirements and reg-
ulations with the 1986 and 1987 tax changes for pensions with a section of
the code that applies to non-U.S. plan deductions and fund income
exemptions. This section of the code (404a) was created to apply U.S.
rules to deductions of contributions to funded plans and the deduction
of book reserve accruals in unfunded plans such as in Germany.
In respect to a qualified funded plan, a U.S. company may reduce
earnings by the amount of pension contributions to a trust or an equiv-
alent of a trust, provided the level of local contribution is determined
by actuarial valuation using reasonable methodology and provided that
United States limitations on deductions, including the full funding limit,
are not exceeded. This makes the United States tax limitations extrater-
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ritorial, for if the deductions are last in the local or the U.S. return, the
contributions are effectively taxed.
The proposal limits the deduction in the United States return, not the
amount that can be contributed locally. Thus U.S. practice for tax-deduc-
tible funding (not accounting) would prevail. This means that the bene-
fits recognized, assumptions, methods, and amortization all must comply
with United States tax law. Apparently the limitations on dollar benefits
and contributions on the dollar amount of compensation are believed
not to apply. But, the full funding limits and the 25 percent of payroll
limitation must be reckoned with. This poses a problem for years in which
major changes were made in German plans, such as in coverage, vesting,
or benefit increases, and were funded or accrued in one to five years
locally.
The 1993 regulation proposes to apply United States tax rules to the
exemption of pension fund income as well as to deductions for contribu-
tions. The regulation would make the foreign pension fund a passive
investment unless the plan is treated as a "qualified" funded plan. This is
a much more serious problem than the mere lowering of deductions for
funding in the U.S. tax calculations. It attacks the very concept of over-
seas pension funds for a U.S. firm.
The proposal would make the pension fund non-qualified under cer-
tain circumstanc~s,subjecting the income of the fund to U.S. taxation.
Failure to meet all the requirements imposed means that the investment
income, including past accumulations, .would become taxable in the
United States.
To meet the requirement in the code, the local "trust" arrangement
must comply with all the rules on prohibited transactions, including
restrictions on real estate, loans, and investments in the firm sponsoring
the plan. The reversion of assets, even if surplus from a non-terminated
plan, would fail these tests. It is the legal ability to make an unsecured
loan or to take a surplus reversion that creates these disqualitying condi-
tions even if a plan is never in surplus or never takes a loan.
One way to avoid this U.S. taxation is to reduce funding overseas. This
is impractical for many firms. Another way would be to attempt to revise
the foreign pension fund to meet U.S. requirements. This may be possi-
ble to do in many common law countries where trusts exists, but is nigh
impossible in civil law countries. It is especially difficult in Germany with
the funded pension arrangements as they are described here today.
The effect of the 1993 proposal is to cast a pall over the local funding of
pension plans of non-U .5. subsidiaries by U.S. parent firms. This is con-
trary to an economic policy that would allow or even encourage foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. firms to be as competitive an employer as other local
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and foreign national employers in providing benefits and their financial
security. It also restricts firms in non-U.S. markets and the hiring of
significant numbers of people at the local site.
The U.S. tax authorities see little justification, given the code, to avoid
the effect of their position related to funded plans. The U.S. regulators
rationalize this outcome as preserving competitiveness between doing
business in the United States and doing business outside the United
States, even though that is probably not their effect, given local law and
practice.
Pension Fund Investments
Long-term rates of return are key to being efficient in operating a pen-
sion fund. In the United States the historical long-term rates, nominal
and real, on the three major investment classes are quite familiar. The
dominant long-term asset class is common stocks or equities, with fixed
income securities and money market instruments clearly behind. The
differential in real yield can be as much as three to five percentage points.
Whether this differential is as pervasive in foreign markets or will be as
available in the future is unclear. The exchanges and investment bankers
in London and Frankfurt provide evidence and arguments that the ad-
vantage in favor of common stocks is not much different than in the
United States. The size of the Frankfurt market is substantial, reaching
442 billion in U.S. dollars at year-end 1993. The developments reported
by Dr. Ahrend concerning the insurance industry's deregulating the in-
vestments behind annuities, and the development of the security ar-
rangement with special funds, could hold out the prospect of progress
and future efficiency for pension funding in Germany.
Concluding Questions
We have discussed the German conditions and practice of German firms
and contrasted them with the German conditions and practice of U.S.
multinationals. It would be interesting to examine U.S. practice and con-
ditions for the German multinational. Because a few of the German-
owned U.S. subsidiaries have substantial underfunded United States
plans, one cannot help but wonder if the book reserve view of funding is
not affecting German funding decisions outside Germany.
Finally, one cannot resist asking the larger question about the future of
the guarantee system in Germany. The cost trend of the guarantee system
is favorable. Over 50 percent of the private benefit values (in 1991), how-
ever, appear to be in book reserves, based on the statistics in Ahrend's
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paper. In the United States, the frequently quoted US$ 53 billion of
underfunding (in 1993) is 5 percent of the private pension obligations
and assets. In the United States there is a clamor to mandate a solution
for this 5 percent problem. One wonders whether similar questions are
being raised in Germany about the future of the guarantee system and
the book reserve system at their level offunding.
